Assassination of senior Lebanese Intelligence offical in Beirut

The death of senior Lebanese Intelligence official, Wissam al Hassan, looks as though it was a meticulously planned assassination to weaken the anti-Assad movement. Hassan was close to Saad Hariri, the leader of the Lebanese opposition and hostile to the regime in Syria. He had been tipped to take over as ISF head  - a Sunni dominated arm of the security apparatus supported by SA, Turkey and Qatar – that has been directly involved in logistical support to the Free Syrian Army. Al-Hassan was pivotal in the Internal Security Forces' Aug. 9 arrest of former Lebanese Information Minister Michel Samaha, a close ally of al Assad, over alleged involvement in a bomb plot commissioned by Damascus. He was also reportedly close to former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, Saad's father, and took part in the investigation into Rafik al-Hariri's 2005 assassination, which implicated Syria and Hezbollah.

The attack in Sassine Square was likely intended to emulate the modus operandi of Salafist Jihadists; an obvious subterfuge given extremists have been moving into the Levant in recent months. Blaming Jihadists would give the Assad-regime a certain amount of deniability whilst stirring up tensions and possible retaliatory violence against Syrian-aligned figures in Lebanon. However it's unlikely that Al-Hassan supporters will believe that Jihadists were responsible. That said it may be too soon to determine which group was responsible for the attack, yet all the markers point towards Damascus with an intent to shift the strategic focus away from its central nucleus and weaken FSA supply lines into Syria.

Consulate attack in Benghazi galvanizes the masses

Benghazi consulate attack:

Wednesday brought confirmation that U.S. Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens and three other American diplomats were killed in Tuesday's attack on the U.S. Consulate in the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi. The consulate building was set on fire by protesters enraged over a film made in the United States that depicts the Prophet Mohammed in a derogatory manner. Similar violent protests have occurred in Egypt and other parts of the Middle East and could spread to the wider Islamic world by Friday. Ansar al-Sharia, a radical Islamist group, claimed responsibility for the attack which took advantage of the security vacuum in Benghazi left behind from last year’s uprising. The incident raised questions as to why increased security measures had not been enforced at the consulate following an attack by Islamic militants on the same building back in June. The British Ambassador’s convoy had also been attacked in Benghazi earlier on in the year illustrating an increased security risk to diplomatic staff operating in the city.

Demonstrations after Friday Prayers:

Following demonstrations in other areas of the Middle East and north Africa, it seems likely that Islamists in Iraq may stage similar demonstrations after Friday prayers. The last religious demonstration to turn violent in Iraq was back in May when 1000s took to the streets of Kurdistan’s capital Erbil, demanding swift punishment for the editor of a Kurdish magazine who had printed an article deemed offensive to Islam by local religious figures. Given the US Embassy’s location inside the IZ, protests may take place in Tahrir Square in the capital’s eastern city centre, or similarly, protests may be witnessed outside either of the American consulates in Kirkuk and Basra city.  

South Sudan- Austerity or Normality?

We have spent the last week in South Sudan looking at the risks and vulnerability associated with the ongoing violence coupled with the Governments lack of income due to no oil based revenues and significant inflationary pressures.  Through this period there seems two clear, and perhaps even somewhat linked, possibilities:

Possibility 1.  Current austerity measures are not able to survive the next few months. This has the potential to lead to a wide range of problems including humanitarian challenges (some are mooting a 'disaster') and the likelihood that Government salaries are not able to be met. Inside the security forces this could be catastrophic, if soldiers and police pursued other sources of illegitimate income.

Possibility 2. Austerity measures actually do work..... after all South Sudan have, in reality, been managing tiny budgets for many, many years. That said, there is an increased and improved spending appetite inside the Government that will need to be moderated.

One thing is clear. The tiny capital of Juba is conjuring much as we close up on the first anniversary of independence.

Sudanese Spiral- Rhetoric or Reality?

Our team in Juba have watched carefully as instability has developed into conflict in Heglig. We have now witnessed this spread laterally along the oil band. The base of insecurity is spreading longitudinally. The question is whether we will see a latitudinal movement. Here's our thoughts.....

Sudan President Omar Al Bashir's recent (overnight) comments to 'liberate' South Sudan are likely more rhetoric than substance. He is well aware that the international community are looking for an East African 'hero' in a sea of regional instability. The Republic of South Sudan in many ways must be that hero. To that end there is only a remote chance that, even if Bashir wanted to, the Sudanese military would not be able to cross the threshold into Juba. The international community would likely stand (mostly invisible) behind the Republic of South Sudan. Think Libya.
 
President Bashir's commented: 'Either we end up in Juba or they end up in Khartoum. The old borders cannot take us both'. 


The reality is that neither is likely. The South has not the capabilities nor intent. The North has not the capability. Superimpose that the North risks inflaming the situation with the international community and United Nations and a status quo will likely continue in the near future along the oil band.